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       ccording to its authors, the purpose of the United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual “is to provide information on the law of 
war to DoD personnel responsible for implementing the law of war and 
executing military operations.”1 Unfortunately, the Manual provides misin-
formation on the law of war governing targeting and attack to its users and 
readers. Those who look to the Manual for guidance on these critical matters 
will be led astray.  
Lawful targeting begins with lawful targets. Problems with the Manual 
begin there as well. I will mention three familiar problems before turning to 
my own concerns. First, international law protects civilians unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities, through acts likely to di-
rectly cause harm in support of one party and against another.
2
 In contrast, 
the Manual asserts that it is lawful to target civilians who “effectively and 
substantially contribute to an adversary’s ability to conduct or sustain com-
bat operations.”
3
 On the contrary, civilians do not lose their protection 
from attack through “acts that—although ‘ultimately harmful to the ene-
my’—are not part of military operations.”
4
 In addition, the Manual states 
that the lawfulness of attacking a civilian may depend on “whether the [ci-
vilian’s] act is of comparable or greater value to a party’s war effort than 
acts that are commonly regarded as taking a direct part in hostilities.”
5
 On 
the contrary, participation in a party’s war effort, no matter how valuable, is 
not legally equivalent to direct participation in hostilities.  
                                                                                                                      
1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 1.1.1 (2015) [hereinafter 
DOD MANUAL].  
2. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-
T, Judgment, ¶ 100 (Dec. 6, 1999); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 46 (2009) [(hereinafter INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE)] (including acts that are an integral part of military operations likely to directly 
cause harm).  
3. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.9.3. The Manual illustrates its position with the ex-
ample of Vietnamese villagers “of all ages and sexes [who], willingly or under duress, 
served as porters [for] . . . communist forces.” Id. ¶ 5.9.3 n.227. It seems that, according to 
the Manual, children forced to serve as porters for opposing forces are lawful targets.  
4. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 150 (2d ed. 2010).   
5. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.9.3. 
 
 









Second, under international law, an object is a military objective liable 
to lawful attack only if it makes “an effective contribution to military ac-
tion.”
6
 In contrast, the Manual states that it is lawful to attack any object 
that makes “an effective contribution to the war-fighting or war-sustaining 
capability of an opposing force.”
7
 On the contrary, as Dinstein writes, 
“[t]he ‘war-fighting’ limb can pass muster, . . . but the ‘war-sustaining’ limb 
is untenable. . . . For an object to qualify as a military objective, there must 
exist a proximate nexus to ‘war-fighting’.”
8
  
Finally, the Manual states that “[u]nder customary international law, no 
legal presumption of civilian status exists for persons or objects, nor is 
there any rule inhibiting commanders or other military personnel from act-
ing based on the information available to him or her in doubtful cases.”
9
 
On the contrary, such a legal rule exists under customary international law, 
though its precise contours remain unsettled. According to one distin-
guished group of experts, “[t]he degree of doubt necessary to preclude an 
attack is that which would cause a reasonable attacker in the same or simi-
lar circumstances to abstain from ordering or executing an attack.”
10
 Alter-
natively, the degree of doubt necessary to preclude an attack may vary 
based on, “inter alia, the intelligence available to the decision maker, the 
urgency of the situation, and the harm likely to result to the operating forc-
es or to persons and objects protected against direct attack from an erro-
neous decision.”
11
 By denying that any such legal rule exists, the Manual 




This article focuses on three elements of lawful targeting that are less 
frequently discussed, but on which the lives of civilians often depend: tar-
                                                                                                                      
6. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).  
7. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.9.3. 
8. DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 95–96.  
9. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.5.3.2. Remarkably, the 1,200 page Manual does not 
mention the customary rule that attacking forces must “do everything feasible to verify 
that targets are military objectives” in order to avoid mistakenly targeting civilians. CUS-
TOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 55. 
10. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MIS-
SILE WARFARE 87 (2010) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL]. 
11. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 76.   
12. For my own view, see Adil Ahmad Haque, Killing in the Fog of War, 86 SOUTHERN 













get selection, precautions in attack, and proportionality. The Manual says 
that 
 
AP I provides that “[w]hen a choice is possible between several military 
objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be 
selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the 
least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.” The United States has 
expressed the view that this rule is not a requirement of customary inter-
national law.13 
 
According to this passage, attackers presented with a choice of targets for 
obtaining a similar military advantage have no legal obligation to select the 
target that places the fewest civilians in danger. In addition, in its discussion 
of precautions in attack, the Manual says that  
 
if a commander determines that taking a precaution would result in oper-
ational risk (i.e., a risk of failing to accomplish the mission) or an in-
creased risk of harm to their own forces, then the precaution would not 
be feasible and would not be required.14  
 
According to this passage, attackers have no legal obligation to take precau-
tions that will entirely avoid or greatly reduce risk to civilians if doing so 
would involve any additional risk to themselves or to their mission. Most 
dramatically, in its section on proportionality, the Manual says that 
 
Harm to the following categories of persons and objects would be under-
stood not to prohibit attacks under the proportionality rule: (1) military 
objectives [that is, enemy combatants, civilians taking a direct part in hos-
tilities, and military equipment]; (2) certain categories of individuals who 
may be employed in or on military objectives; and (3) human shields.15  
 
According to this passage, the proportionality rule permits attackers to col-
laterally kill civilians forced to serve as human shields, no matter how 
many, in pursuit of any military advantage, no matter how small.  
Of course, it is possible that these passages simply misstate DoD’s legal 
positions. If so, then perhaps this article will encourage their prompt revi-
sion. However, after nearly two decades of drafting and inter-agency re-
                                                                                                                      
13. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.11.5.  
14. Id. ¶ 5.3.3.2. 
15. Id. ¶ 5.12.3.  
 
 









view, we should presume that the Manual means what it says. Certainly, we 
should not presume that DoD expects users of the Manual to read between 
its lines to divine its true meaning. After all, it is a manual, not a constitu-
tion, we are expounding.   
On each point, the Manual reflects neither lex lata nor lex ferenda. In my 
judgment, the Manual does not describe customary international law as it 
was in 1996, when work on the Manual began. Certainly, the Manual does 
not describe customary international law as it is in 2016. State practice, in-
cluding U.S. practice, continued to evolve in the intervening decades. The 
Manual “is intended to be a description of the law as of the date of the 
manual’s promulgation.”16 In my view, the Manual describes a law of war 
that no longer exists.  
The law of war—also known as the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or 
international humanitarian law (IHL)—aims to strike a reasonable balance 
between humanity and military necessity. Yet, on these critical issues, the 
Manual does not merely tip the balance in favor of attackers. Instead, the 
Manual effectively strikes civilians from the scales. The balance itself is of-
ten misunderstood. Legal positions that ignore civilian protection frequent-
ly reduce rather than enhance military effectiveness. If the law of war loses 
its moral credibility then combatants will not trust that they can obey lawful 
orders in good conscience. They will hesitate, question, and dissent, look-
ing elsewhere for the normative guidance that law ought to provide. In-
stead of relying on the law to strike a reasonable balance between humanity 
and necessity, combatants will have no choice but to strike their own.17 
My substantive objections to the Manual should not be mistaken for 
personal criticism of its authors. The authors of the Manual are fine people, 
good lawyers, and dedicated public servants. They operated under a variety 
of institutional constraints, including the need to reach consensus and to 
reflect prior DoD positions. Nevertheless, the stakes are too high to mince 
words. With all due respect to its authors, the positions taken in the Manual 
are both wrong and dangerous. If U.S. forces do what the Manual permits 
then they will kill civilian men, women, and children in violation of interna-
                                                                                                                      
16. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 1.1.2.  
17. Cf. Richard C. Schragger, Cooler Heads: The Difference between the President’s Lawyers 
and the Military’s, SLATE (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_polit 
ics/jurisprudence/2006/09/cooler_heads.html (“Law allows our troops to engage in 
forceful, violent acts with relatively little hesitation or moral qualms. Law makes just wars 
possible by creating a well-defined legal space within which individual soldiers can act 













tional law and without moral justification. On the other hand, if U.S. forces 
refrain from conduct that the Manual claims is lawful then the actual con-
duct of war will be regulated not by international law but by personal con-
science and national policy. Either outcome subverts the aim of protecting 
civilians and guiding soldiers through international legal norms.  
The law of war is international law. The law for the United States is the 
law for Russia and China, for Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, for North Korea 
and Pakistan, for Syria and Sudan. The legal authority that we claim for 
ourselves today, others will claim for themselves tomorrow. It is no de-
fense of the Manual that our armed forces, surely, will never actually do 
what the Manual says that they may lawfully do. Surely, their moral charac-
ter, professional integrity, and martial honor will prevent them from exer-
cising the outer limits of the legal authority that the Manual claims for 
them. Yet what the Manual claims is legal for us, the Manual necessarily 
claims is legal for all.  
The organization of this article is straightforward. Each part opens with 
a scenario that illustrates the legal issue at hand, followed by a presentation 
of contemporary international law and a legal analysis of the Manual’s con-
trary position as well as its supporting evidence. The first two parts—on 
target selection and precautions in attack—conclude by examining the logic 
of the Manual’s position, or lack thereof. In contrast, the final part—on 
proportionality and human shields—concludes by assessing three rather 
cursory arguments that the Manual offers in support of its position. Since 
these arguments raise quite distinct issues, I analyze them separately, chal-
lenging their bases in law and logic.  
 
II. TARGET SELECTION 
 
Opposing forces need to cross both Bridge A and Bridge B in order to 
transport weapons and equipment to the front line. Destroying either 
bridge would prevent them from doing so. Bridge A is a major commuter 
route, while Bridge B carries little civilian traffic. If your forces destroy 
Bridge A then—even if your forces take reasonable precautions in carrying 
out the attack—you expect them to kill at least ten civilians. In contrast, if 
your forces destroy Bridge B then you expect them to kill no civilians. You 
determine that the deaths of ten innocent civilians, though tragic, would 
not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage of destroy-
ing Bridge A. Of course, you could obtain a similar military advantage 
without killing any civilians, simply by destroying Bridge B instead.  
 
 









As a legal officer, what would you advise? As a commander, what 
would you order? As an operator, what order would you obey?  
 
A. The Law 
 
Under Protocol I,  
 
[w]hen a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtain-
ing a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that 
the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian 
lives and to civilian objects.18  
 
This provision—which I will call the target selection rule—was adopted unan-
imously and ratified by all 174 States party to Protocol I without reserva-
tion.19 Applied to the scenario described above, under Protocol I it would 
be unlawful to destroy Bridge A, killing ten civilians, rather than destroy 
Bridge B, killing no civilians, to obtain a similar military advantage. Equiva-
lent scenarios may arise involving roads, tunnels, railroads, power lines, and 
other lines of communication. In such cases, the target selection rule simp-
ly requires what common sense and elementary considerations of humanity 
demand.  
Of course, the United States is one of nineteen States that are not party 
to Protocol I. Accordingly, the United States is bound only by customary 
international law. Some argue that, paradoxically, the near-universal ratifica-
tion of a treaty occludes its relationship with customary law.20 On this ap-
proach, apparently positive practice of State parties like Australia, Germa-
ny, and the United Kingdom may be dismissed as reflecting treaty obliga-
tions. Conversely, the wartime conduct of non-parties like Sri Lanka may 
be accepted as contrary practice that reflects or changes customary law. 
Indeed, if we exclude the practice of 174 States and consider only the prac-
                                                                                                                      
18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(3), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].  
19. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 65. 
20. According to the so-called “Baxter paradox,” “as the number of parties to a treaty 
increases, it becomes more difficult to demonstrate what is the state of customary interna-
tional law dehors the treaty.” In addition, “[a]s the express acceptance of the treaty in-
creases, the number of states not parties whose practice is relevant diminishes. There will 
be less scope for the development of international law dehors the treaty . . . .” See Richard 













tice of nineteen States then it is hard to see how any constraint on the con-
duct of hostilities could reflect the extensive and virtually uniform State 
practice necessary to establish customary law. In my view, this approach is 
a blueprint for legal stagnation at best and legal regression at worst.  
Fortunately, the relationship between treaty and custom is not so para-
doxical. A treaty provision may codify established customary law, crystalize 
emerging customary law, or inspire the progressive development of cus-
tomary law.21 The fact that no party to Protocol I introduced objections, 
declarations or reservations regarding the target selection rule is itself sub-
stantial—though not dispositive—evidence that many parties believed that 
the target selection rule either codified existing custom or crystallized 
emerging custom.  
According to the ICRC, the target selection rule,  
 
described “as the lesser of two evils,” was already in the Draft Rules of 
1956 (Article 8(a), paragraph 2). It was included in the 1973 draft and the 
Conference accepted it without much discussion. It is in accordance with 
the actual practices of belligerents in certain cases, particularly with re-
spect to occupied allied countries. 
 
In this field mention could be made of attacks launched against enemy 
road and rail traffic; some belligerents have tried to attack the adversary 
only when this would not result in severe damage for the population. In-
stead of attacking railway stations, which are usually located in towns, the 
railway lines were hit at crucial points, but away from inhabited areas; the 
same action was taken with respect to roads. 
 
Such examples show that it is possible to choose objectives so that their 
destruction does not imperil the population and civilian objects, while still 
gaining the same military advantage.22 
                                                                                                                      
21. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 20). See also Hon. Fausto Pocar, To What Extent Is Protocol I Customary International 
Law?, 78 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 337, 341 (2002) (noting that “the treaty itself is 
an important piece of State practice for the determination of customary law, although its 
role in this regard must be carefully assessed,” and considering “the impact that any sub-
sequent practice of the contracting States in the application of the treaty which establishes 
their agreement or disagreement regarding its interpretation may bear on the development 
of a customary norm”). 
22. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 2226–28 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinar-
ski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL I COMMENTARY].  
 
 










Evidently, no party felt that the target selection rule places unreasonable 
constraints on military operations. To my knowledge, no party has ex-
pressed regrets in the decades since.  
For its part, the U.S. Air Force endorsed the target selection rule in its 
1976 law of war pamphlet—one year prior to Protocol I’s adoption and 
two years prior its entry into force.23 Logically, the Air Force must have 
thought that the proposed treaty provision codified established customary 
law or that the negotiating process was crystallizing emerging customary 
law. Certainly, the Air Force could not have thought that the target selec-
tion rule was legally binding on U.S. forces in virtue of a treaty that had not 
been finalized let alone ratified by the United States.  
Subsequent State practice and opinio juris confirms that the target selec-
tion rule is a requirement of customary international law.24 The ICRC cites 
the “official statements and reported practice” of thirteen States directly 
affirming the customary status of the rule.25 Importantly, the ICRC cites 
the practice of seven States that were not, at the time, parties to Protocol I 
and whose positive practice therefore cannot be attributed to their treaty 
obligations.26 Finally, the ICRC “found no official contrary practice” deny-
ing that the target selection rule is customary law. The ICRC found “only 
one instance of apparently contrary practice,” to which we will return 
shortly.  
Unsurprisingly, the target selection rule is found in the law of war 
manuals of at least eighteen States, including Australia, Canada, France, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.27 Although most of these 
States are party to Protocol I, it is hard to believe that, were they to with-
                                                                                                                      
23. Department of the Air Force, AFP 110-31, International Law—The Conduct of 
Armed Conflict and Air Operations 5-9–5-10 (1976). See also id. at 5-7 (“Based on these 
developments [including the preparation of Protocol I] it is now possible to discuss mean-
ingfully the law of armed conflict as it affects aerial bombardment.”). The 1976 pamphlet 
was subsequently rescinded but remains widely cited as evidence of U.S. practice, includ-
ing in the DoD Manual itself.  
24. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 65 (“State 
practice establishes this [target selection] rule as a norm of customary international law 
applicable in international, and arguably also in non-international, armed conflicts.”).  
25. Id. These States are Egypt, France, Jordan, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, 
Malaysia, the Netherlands, Syria, the United States (more on this in a moment), and Zim-
babwe.  
26. Id. at 66–67. These States are France, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, and 
the United States (again, more on this in a moment).  













draw from Protocol I, these States would consider themselves legally free 
to ignore alternative targets that offer similar military advantage but risk 
less civilian harm.  
Tellingly, the target selection rule appears in nine military manuals ap-
plicable to non-international armed conflicts, as well as in agreements be-
tween parties to the (partly) non-international conflict in the former Yugo-
slavia.28 This practice also cannot be attributed to obligations found in Pro-
tocol I, since the Protocol applies only to international armed conflicts. 
Again, the absence of contrary practice is striking. No party to Protocol I 
has denied that the target selection rule applies to non-international armed 
conflicts. For their part, the expert drafters of the well-regarded San Remo 
Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict also concluded that the 
target selection rule is part of customary law applicable to non-international 
armed conflict.29  
Likewise, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) found that the provisions of Article 57 of Protocol I, which include 
the target selection rule, “are now part of customary international law, not 
only because they specify and flesh out general pre-existing norms, but also 
because they do not appear to be contested by any State, including those 
which have not ratified the Protocol.”30 In particular, the ICTY stated that 
these provisions spell out the “general principle prescribing that reasonable 
care must be taken in attacking military objectives so that civilians are not 
needlessly injured through carelessness.”31  
Finally, the well-regarded HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Air and Missile Warfare endorses the target selection rule as a “black-letter 
                                                                                                                      
28. Id. at 67. These States are Benin, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Madagascar, Ni-
geria, Togo and Yugoslavia. See also Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of 
International Humanitarian Law between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, para. 6, Nov. 27, 1991, https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/case-study/yugo 
slavia-agreements-case-study.htm; Agreement between Representatives of Mr. Alija Izet-
begović (President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and President of the Party 
of Democratic Action), Representatives of Mr. Radovan Karadžić (President of the Serbi-
an Democratic Party), and Representative of Mr. Miljenko Brkić (President of the Croa-
tian Democratic Community), para. 2.5, May 22, 1992, https://www.icrc.org/casebook/ 
doc/case-study/yugoslavia-agreements-case-study.htm. 
29. See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY, & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: WITH COMMEN-
TARY 25, 28 (2006).  
30. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16, Judgment, ¶ 524 (Int’l Crim. 













rule” of customary international law.32 The HPCR Manual reflects the con-
sensus views of a 31-member group of experts from Australia, Canada, 
China, Germany, Israel, Norway, the UK, and the United States, among 
other nations.33 According to the Commentary on the HPCR Manual,  
 
Whenever three or more participants in the Group of Experts objected to 
a given text, it was changed to meet such objections or bridge over con-
flicting views. In the rare instances in which compromise formulas 
proved beyond the reach of the Group of Experts, it was agreed to fol-
low in the text the majority view but to give in the Commentary full ex-
posure to the dissenting opinions.34 
 
Tellingly, the text of the HPCR Manual restates the target selection rule 
without qualification and the Commentary records no dissenting opinions 
regarding the rule’s customary status.  
 
B. The Manual 
 
As we have seen, the U.S. Air Force endorsed the target selection rule in its 
1976 law of war pamphlet, which can only be interpreted as an acceptance 
of the rule as a requirement of customary international law.35 Nevertheless, 
the DoD Manual states the following:  
 
AP I provides that “[w]hen a choice is possible between several military 
objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be 
selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the 
least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.” The United States has 
expressed the view that this rule is not a requirement of customary inter-
national law.36 
 
It follows that, according to the Manual, States that are not party to Proto-
col I are not bound by the target selection rule. Returning to the example 
with which this part began, the Manual entails that you may lawfully strike 
                                                                                                                      
32. COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL, supra note 10, at 128. 
33. Interestingly, the group of experts included W. Hays Parks of the DoD’s Office 
of General Counsel. Id. at 9. If Parks conveyed the DoD’s position on this issue then it 
appears that it did not garner much support from other members of the group. 
34. Id. at 4.  
35. AFP 110-31, supra note 23, at 5-9–5-10. 













either Bridge A, killing ten civilians, or Bridge B, killing no civilians. Of 
course, you must take feasible precautions in attacking either target and 
cancel or suspend an attack on either target if the expected harm to civil-
ians appears excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. 
However, according to the Manual, if an attack on either target would satis-
fy these requirements then the choice between the two is not governed by 
any legal rule. So far as the law is concerned, you may select your target by 
flipping a coin rather than by considering the likely consequences for civil-
ians.  
Importantly, the Manual does not say that the target selection rule of 
API is a requirement of customary international law provided that it is inter-
preted in some specified way. On the contrary, the Manual says that the 
target selection rule of API is not a requirement of customary international 
law. Nor does the Manual identify an alternative rule of customary law 
regulating the selection of targets that promise similar military benefits but 
threaten different humanitarian costs. It seems that, according to the Man-
ual, customary law is silent on this basic element of warfare.  
Strikingly, the Manual does not cite the practice or opinio juris of a single 
foreign State in support of its position that the target selection rule is not a 
requirement of customary international law. Nor does the Manual reflect 
U.S. operational practice. The Manual does not cite a single occasion on 
which U.S. forces were faced with a choice of targets for obtaining similar 
military advantage, knowingly selected a target that put more civilians in 
harm’s way than other targets, and later claimed that their selection of tar-
gets conformed to customary law. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a U.S. 
commander ordering an attack under such circumstances or to imagine a 
U.S. operator obeying such an order.  
Instead, the Manual quotes a 1991 telegram sent by the United States to 
the ICRC in response to an ICRC memorandum on the applicability of 
international humanitarian law in the Gulf region: 
 
Paragraph 4B(4) [of the ICRC memo] contains the language of Article 
57(3) of Protocol I, and is not a part of customary law. The provision ap-
plies “when a choice is possible . . . ;” it is not mandatory. An attacker 
may comply with it if it is possible to do so, subject to mission accom-
plishment and allowable risk, or he may determine that it is impossible to 
make such a determination.37 
                                                                                                                      
37. Id. ¶ 5.11.5 n.303 (quoting U.S. Comments on the International Committee of the 
Red Cross’s Memorandum on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law in the 
 
 










Like the Manual, the telegram did not cite the practice or opinio juris of a 
single foreign State in support of its position that Article 57(3) of Protocol 
I is not a part of customary law. Perhaps the authors of the Manual felt in-
stitutionally constrained to restate the position taken in the telegram. Alter-
natively, perhaps the authors were well-positioned to encourage a change in 
U.S. policy. In any event, the Manual can find no legal support in a bare 
assertion that, even if tenable in 1991, is unsustainable in 2016.   
For its part, the ICRC initially seemed puzzled by the telegram, writing 
that “the United States denied that this rule was customary but then restat-
ed the rule and recognised its validity, consistent with its other practice,” 
namely the 1976 Air Force pamphlet.38 The ICRC ultimately interpreted 
the telegram not as a rejection of the rule but as a qualified endorsement of 
it, writing that: 
 
The United States has emphasised that the obligation to select an objec-
tive the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to ci-
vilian lives and to civilian objects is not an absolute obligation, as it only 
applies “when a choice is possible” and thus “an attacker may comply 
with it if it is possible to do so, subject to mission accomplishment and 
allowable risk, or he may determine that it is impossible to make such a 
determination.”39 
 
Of course, the Manual cites the telegram for the proposition that “[t]he 
United States has expressed the view that this rule is not a requirement of 
customary international law.” It therefore seems that the Manual rejects the 
ICRC’s interpretation of the telegram and that the citation to the telegram 
does not in any way qualify the denial that the target selection rule is a rule 
of customary law.40   
                                                                                                                      
Gulf Region (Jan. 11, 1991), as reprinted in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 1991–1999 at 2057, 2064 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 
2005) [hereinafter U.S. Comments]).  
38. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 67.  
39. Id.  
40. But see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Let’s Balance the Argument About the DoD Law of War 
Manual and Targeting, JUST SECURITY (July 10, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/2454 
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In fact, the telegram nowhere recognizes the validity of the target selec-
tion rule as a part of customary law. The first sentence says that Article 
57(3) “is not a part of customary law.” The second and third sentences 
state the U.S. interpretation of “[t]he provision”—that is, of Article 
57(3)—specifically of the phrase “when a choice is possible.” However, 
since the United States is not a party to Protocol I, Article 57(3) does not 
apply to the United States no matter how it is reasonably interpreted.41  
Perhaps the ICRC was confused by the telegram’s repeated use of the 
pronoun “it.” However, upon close inspection, “it” clearly refers to “the 
provision,” which in turn refers to Article 57(3) of Protocol I, which the 
telegram clearly says is not a part of customary law. The telegram does not 
say that Article 57(3) imperfectly reflects customary law. The telegram says 
that Article 57(3) is not a part of customary law. 
In any event, if the Manual’s authors intended the provision to be a 
qualified endorsement of the target selection rule as a requirement of cus-
tomary international law, then they would have made that clear in the text 
of the Manual. They would not have done so through a parenthetical quota-
tion contained in a footnote that denies that the rule is part of customary 
law. In my judgment, the Manual is clearly wrong, but at least it is wrong 
clearly.   
By way of contrast, the HPCR Manual recognizes the target selection 
rule as a requirement of customary international law. The Commentary to 
the HPCR Manual goes on to state that 
 
There is no requirement to select among several objectives if doing so 
would be militarily unreasonable. As an example, if a choice has to be 
made between two alternative military objectives—one of which is more 
densely defended than the other—the attacker is not required to select 
the latter when heavy casualties are anticipated to the attacking force.42 
 
                                                                                                                      
41. It may seem odd for the United States to offer an interpretation of a treaty provi-
sion to which it is not bound and which it does not recognize as reflecting customary law. 
In fact, the United States routinely comments on the interpretation of Protocol I, includ-
ing in the Manual itself. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.3.3.4 (“AP I Obligation 
to Take Constant Care to Spare Civilians and Civilian Objects”); id. ¶ 5.5.3.2 (“AP I Pre-
sumptions in Favor of Civilian Status in Conducting Attacks”); id. ¶ 5.5.8.2 (“AP I Obliga-
tion for Combatants to Distinguish Themselves During Attacks or Military Operations 
Preparatory to an Attack”); id. ¶ 5.9.1.2 (“AP I, Article 51(3) Provision on Direct Partici-
pation in Hostilities”). 
42. COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL, supra note 10, at 129.  
 
 









The authors of the HPCR Manual had no trouble clearly endorsing the tar-
get selection rule as part of customary law while explaining how they inter-
pret it. If the drafters of the DoD Manual had wished to do the same then 
they were more than capable of doing so.  
The United States now appears to stand alone as the only nation in the 
world to deny that the target selection rule is a requirement of customary 
international law. The United States has yet to offer any evidence in sup-
port of its claim, other than its own twenty-five year old assertion. This 
bare assertion was itself unsupported by any recorded practice of acting 
contrary to the target selection rule and claiming legal authority to do so. 
Nor has the United States identified an alternative rule of customary law 
regulating the target selection process.  
To be sure, States make customary international law. However, one 
State cannot make customary international law. When one State denies that 
a given rule is part of customary law that State must support its claim by 
citing foreign State practice and opinio juris, just like anyone else making an 
objective claim about the current state of customary law. In contrast, if a 
State cannot cite any contrary practice or opinio juris other than its own then 
it should concede that the rule otherwise reflects customary international 
law but argue that “the rule is not binding upon a State that has persistently 
objected to that rule during its development.”43 In this case, the 1976 Air 
Force pamphlet endorsing the target selection rule makes it hard for the 
United States to persuasively argue that it has persistently objected to the rule 
and therefore is not bound by it. Nevertheless, such an alternative position 
would at least have some legal basis, since the Air Force pamphlet may 
have reflected the views of the Air Force but not that of the United States 
government as a whole. In contrast, the position of the Manual appears to 




In principle, positive law can be as illogical, immoral, or unwise as its hu-
man creators. However, we should reject an interpretation of positive law 
that generates illogical, immoral, or unwise results absent overwhelming 
evidence in its favor. As it happens, the Manual’s rejection of the target se-
                                                                                                                      
43. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 1.8.4 (“Even if a rule otherwise reflects customary 
international law, the rule is not binding upon a State that has persistently objected to that 













lection rule seems illogical given the Manual’s recognition of the precau-
tions rule, the proportionality rule, and the principle of humanity.44  
To its credit, the Manual states that “[c]ombatants must take feasible 
precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians.”45 In 
contrast, as we have seen, the Manual states that combatants need not se-
lect targets for attack so as to reduce the risk of harm to civilians. Evidently, 
harm to civilians often turns more on which targets are attacked than on 
how attacks on those targets are carried out. It seems illogical to regulate 
the latter but not the former.  
Similarly, the Manual states that, when “the use of certain weapons ra-
ther than others may lower the risk of incidental harm, while offering the 
same or superior military advantage,” combatants are legally required to 
select the less risky weapons.46 In other words, according to the Manual, 
combatants must select weapons that lower the risk of incidental harm but 
need not select targets that do the same. Since the risk of incidental harm 
often depends more on the selection of targets than on the selection of 
weapons, again it seems illogical to regulate the latter but not the former.  
In addition, the Manual accepts the proportionality rule, namely that 
“[c]ombatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of life 
or injury to civilians . . . would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage expected to be gained.”47 It is indeed wrong to kill 
civilians in pursuit of a military advantage too small to justify their deaths. 
However, it seems even worse to kill civilians in pursuit of a military ad-
vantage when one could obtain the same or a similar military advantage 
while killing fewer civilians. To refrain from the former but not the latter 
gets things backwards.48  
The target selection rule, the precautions rule, and the proportionality 
rule form a logically coherent triad. One rule governs what to attack, anoth-
er governs how to attack, and the third governs whether to attack. Together, 
these three rules ensure that a lawful attack on a lawful target will inflict 
neither unnecessary nor excessive incidental harm on civilians. Rejecting 
                                                                                                                      
44. See infra. 
45. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.11 (emphasis added).  
46. Id. ¶ 5.11.3.  
47. Id. ¶ 5.12.  
48. Interestingly, the Canadian LOAC Manual states the target selection rule under 
the heading of “Proportionality and multiple targets.” CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF 
(CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL 
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one of these rules while endorsing the others leaves a logically inexplicable 
gap in the law.  
The Manual’s rejection of the target selection rule seems even more il-
logical given that the rule appears to follow logically from a general princi-
ple that the Manual recognizes as foundational. The Manual accepts that the 
principle of humanity “forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruc-
tion unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.”49 Yet if an 
attacker can obtain the same military advantage by attacking any one of 
several targets then failing to select the target that places the fewest civil-
ians in harm’s way inflicts more harm than necessary to accomplish that 
military purpose. For example, if you can obtain the same military ad-
vantage by destroying Bridge A, killing ten civilians, or by destroying 
Bridge B, killing no civilians, then an attack on Bridge A would seem to 
inflict suffering and injury unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military 
purpose. In such cases, the target selection rule simply requires what the 
principle of humanity demands.  
It seems illogical to recognize humanity as a fundamental principle of 
customary international law while insisting that the target selection rule is 
not a requirement of customary international law at all. In general, “[w]here 
a rule of customary international law is logical, because it can be deduced 
from an existing underlying principle, the burden of proving the rule by 
way of inductive reasoning is proportionally diminished.”50 Conversely, the 
burden of disproving a logical rule, deducible from an accepted principle, is 
proportionally increased. If the Manual offered decisive evidence of State 
practice and opinio juris in support of its position then we would have no 
choice but to accept that the fault lies not in the Manual but in the law it-
self. As we have seen, the Manual offers no such evidence, nor could it do 
so. In my view, the target selection rule was a requirement of customary 
international law when Protocol I was adopted in 1977, when the U.S. tele-
gram to the ICRC was sent in 1991, and when work on the Manual began 
in 1996. Certainly, the target selection rule is a requirement of customary 
international law in 2016.  
 
                                                                                                                      
49. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 2.3. 
50. Stefan Talmon, Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between 
Induction, Deduction and Assertion, 26 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 417, 














III. PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK AND ACCEPTANCE OF RISK 
 
Based on surveillance, human intelligence, and thermal imagining, you de-
termine that an insurgent commander is asleep in his home with his five 
young children. Based on the available information, you determine that a 
missile strike on the house will certainly kill the commander, as well as all 
five children, at no risk to your forces. You also determine that a night raid 
by special forces will almost certainly kill the commander and kill none of 
the children, but that there is a small chance that the commander will wake 
up and harm one of your operators before he is killed. Finally, you deter-
mine that the deaths of five innocent children, though horrific, would not 
be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from killing 
the commander. Importantly, you could almost certainly obtain the same 
military advantage without killing any of the children by accepting a small 
risk to your own forces.  
As a legal officer, what would you advise? As a commander, what 
would you order? As an operator, what order would you respect?  
 
A. The Law 
 
Under customary international law, “[a]ll feasible precautions must be tak-
en to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”51 This general rule of 
precautions in attack generates a number of specific obligations. Attacking 
forces must “do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objec-
tives” in order to avoid mistakenly targeting civilians.52 Similarly, attacking 
forces “must do everything feasible to assess whether the attack may be 
expected” to inflict excessive harm on civilians.53 More distinctively, attack-
ing forces “must take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimis-
ing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects.”54 In particular, attacking forces “must give effective advance 
                                                                                                                      
51. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 51. 
52. Id. at 55. See also Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 57(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
53. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 58.  
54. Id. at 56. See also Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 57(2)(a)(ii); id. art. 57(4) (“In the 
conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the conflict shall . . . take 
all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.”).  
 
 









warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circum-
stances do not permit.”55  
Since no one disputes the customary status of the precautions rule, let 
us turn to its proper interpretation. Under customary international law, fea-
sible precautions are those precautions that are “practicable or practically 
possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including 
humanitarian and military considerations.”56 Intuitively, taking into account 
humanitarian and military considerations means balancing the humanitarian 
considerations in favor of taking a precaution and the military considera-
tions against taking that precaution.57 If the humanitarian considerations 
outweigh the military considerations then the precaution is required. Con-
versely, if the military considerations outweigh the humanitarian considera-
tions then the precaution is not required.  
Returning to the scenario with which this part began, the precautions 
rule would require you to raid the home, at some risk to your own forces, 
rather than to bomb the home, certainly killing the five children. In ordi-
nary life, it is not reasonable to take a grave risk of killing innocent people 
rather than accept a small risk to yourself. The reasonable conduct of war is 
no different. While combatants are not always required to accept significant 
risks in order to protect civilians from others, combatants are required to 
accept some risks in order to avoid killing civilians themselves.58  
This balanced approach is reflected in State practice, opinio juris and ex-
pert opinion. Since there is no difference between customary law and Pro-
tocol I with respect to precautionary obligations, let us examine the posi-
tion of the United Kingdom. The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 
notes that, in order to comply with their precautionary obligation to do 
everything feasible to verify that their targets are military objectives, “tradi-
tionally commanders have accepted some risk in identifying targets by us-
ing, for example, artillery spotters, forward air controllers, and intelligence 
gatherers operating in enemy-held territory.”59 In other words, attackers 
                                                                                                                      
55. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 62. See also 
Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 57(2)(c). 
56. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 54, 70. 
57 See Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 445, 462 (2005). 
58. See, e.g., Haque, supra note 12, at 106–10; David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protec-
tion, in READING WALZER 277 (Yitzhak Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds., 2014). 
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customarily accept risks to themselves if necessary to reduce the risk of 
mistakenly targeting civilians.  
Elsewhere, the UK Manual observes that “[s]ometimes a method of at-
tack that would minimize the risk to civilians may involve increased risk to 
the attacking forces. The law is not clear as to the degree of risk that the 
attacker must accept.”60 Put the other way around, attackers must accept 
some degree of risk in order to minimize risk to civilians, although the re-
quired degree of risk cannot be precisely quantified. Here, as elsewhere, the 
balance of humanitarian and military considerations calls for human judg-
ment rather than mathematical calculation.  
In a difficult passage that requires close reading, the UK Manual cor-
rectly notes that “[t]he proportionality principle does not itself require the 
attacker to accept increased risk,”61 but only to refrain from inflicting ex-
cessive incidental harm on civilians. In contrast, invoking the language of 
the precautions rule, the UK Manual goes on to say that if “alternative, 
practically possible methods of attack would reduce the collateral risks” 
then “the attacker may have to accept the increased risk as being the only 
way of pursuing an attack in a proportionate way.”62  
Obviously, attackers may have to accept increased risk if necessary to 
reduce the risk of inflicting excessive incidental harm on civilians. Howev-
er, the phrase “pursuing an attack in a proportionate way” refers to how an 
attack should be carried out rather than to whether an attack should be car-
ried out. In context, “pursuing an attack in a proportionate way” can only 
mean using methods of attack that reduce collateral risks without placing 
attackers at excessive or disproportionate risk. 
To see this last point more clearly, notice that the UK Manual seems to 
adopt the view of A.P.V. Rogers, who writes that,  
 
by adopting a method of attack that would reduce incidental damage, the 
risk to the attacking troops may be increased. The law is not clear as to 
the degree of care required of the attacker and the degree of risk that he 
must be prepared to take.63  
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Importantly, Rogers concludes that “[m]ilitary necessity cannot always 
override humanity. In taking care to protect civilians, soldiers must accept 
some element of risk to themselves.”64 Rogers quotes the British Defense 
Doctrine of his day, which stated that “there may be occasions when a 
commander will have to accept a higher level of risk to his own forces in 
order to avoid or reduce collateral damage to the enemy’s civil popula-
tion.”65 Elsewhere, Rogers warns that “the feasible test must not be re-
stricted so far as to render nugatory the protection of the civilian popula-
tion.”66 
Other experts share Rogers’ balanced view of precautions in attack. For 
example, as Michael Schmitt argues, “[i]t is reasonable to require military 
forces to assume some degree of risk to avoid collateral damage and inci-
dental injury. They do so regularly. By this analysis, the greater the antici-
pated collateral damage or incidental injury, the greater the risk they can 
reasonably be asked to shoulder.”67 Similarly, Dinstein concludes that 
“[w]hat is called for is a reasonable ‘allocation of risk’ between the attack-
er’s military personnel and the enemy civilians.”68 
Finally, the Commentary to the HPCR Manual states—without record-
ed dissent among the group of experts—that “whereas a particular course 
of action may be considered non-feasible due to military considerations 
(such as excessive risks to aircraft and their crews), some risks have to be 
accepted in light of humanitarian considerations.”69 Evidently, “excessive 
risks” to attackers are risks that are excessive in relation to the relevant 
humanitarian considerations. If a course of action would greatly increase 
risk to attackers and only slightly reduce risk to civilians then the attackers 
do not have to accept such excessive risks. Conversely, if a course of action 
would slightly increase risk to attackers and greatly reduce risk to civilians 
then the attackers have to accept such reasonable risks.  
On this balanced approach, the precautions rule does not require sol-
diers to take suicidal risks, or to doom an otherwise lawful mission, in or-
der to avoid any risk of harming civilians. However, the precautions rule 
                                                                                                                      
64. Id. at 177.  
65. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, JWP 0-01, British Defence Doctrine 
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66. A.P.V. Rogers, Conduct of Combat and Risks Run by the Civilian Population, 21 MILI-
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67. Schmitt, supra note 57, at 462. For my views, see Haque, supra note 12, at 106–10. 
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may require attackers to accept some additional risk in order to reduce the 
risks that their actions pose to civilians. Here, as elsewhere, there will be 
hard cases in which reasonable commanders must exercise their profes-
sional judgment—with which reasonable observers may in turn disagree. 
However, as elsewhere, there will also be clear cases in which any reasona-
ble commander would accept some risk to attacking forces or to mission 
success in order to entirely avoid or greatly reduce the possibility of need-
lessly killing civilians.  
  
B. The Manual 
 
The Manual recognizes that “[p]arties to a conflict must take feasible pre-
cautions to reduce the risk of harm to the civilian population and other 
protected persons and objects.”70 The Manual also accepts that feasible pre-
cautions are those precautions that are “practicable or practically possible, 
taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humani-
tarian and military considerations.”71 However, the Manual asserts that  
 
if a commander determines that taking a precaution would result in oper-
ational risk (i.e., a risk of failing to accomplish the mission) or an in-
creased risk of harm to their own forces, then the precaution would not 
be feasible and would not be required.72  
 
In other words, if taking a precaution would even slightly increase risk to 
attacking forces or to mission success then that precaution is infeasible per 
se, even if taking that precaution would entirely avoid or greatly reduce risk 
to civilians. Returning to the case with which this section began, according 
to the Manual, it would be perfectly lawful to strike the house with a mis-
sile, certainly killing five children, rather than raid the house, killing no 
children, while placing attacking forces at only slightly greater risk. Put an-
other way, if the proportionality rule does not prohibit a missile strike then 
the precautions rule does not require a raid.  
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It seems that, according to the Manual, “feasible” precautions are not 
all precautions that are practicable or practically possible but instead only 
precautions that are free of risk to the attacking force. Far from taking into 
account both humanitarian and military considerations, the Manual seems 
to disregard or exclude the former when they conflict with the latter—as 
they almost always do.  
To see that the DoD’s view is dangerously unbalanced, imagine if a 
human rights group asserted the following:  
 
If a commander determines that failing to take a precaution would result 
in an increased risk of harm to civilians, then the precaution is feasible 
and is required. 
 
Such a view would be dismissed immediately, since it gives humanitarian 
considerations absolute priority over military considerations while the pre-
cautions rule requires taking into account both humanitarian and military 
considerations. Yet the DoD’s position goes just as far, except in the oppo-
site direction. The DoD’s position gives military considerations absolute 
priority over humanitarian considerations in determining an attacker’s pre-
cautionary obligations. Neither view strikes a reasonable balance between 
the guiding concerns of the law of war.  
The DoD appears to differ on this point with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, who in 2013 took the position that “circumstances permit” effective 
advance warning of an attack when “any degradation in attack effectiveness 
is outweighed by the reduction in collateral damage [e.g.,] because advanced 
warning allowed the adversary to get civilians out of the target area.”73 On 
this balanced view, attackers must weigh the military reasons to attack 
without warning against the humanitarian reasons to give advance warning. 
If the latter outweigh the former then advance warning must be given; if 
not, then not.  
Indeed, U.S. targeting practice routinely accepts some risk to attacking 
forces in order to avoid harming civilians. For example, in a 1991 letter to 
the UN Secretary General regarding its conduct of hostilities with Iraq, the 
United States stressed that “allied aircraft involved in these attacks are tak-
ing every precaution to avoid civilian casualties. These pilots are in fact 
placing themselves in greater danger in order to minimize collateral damage 
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and civilian casualties.”74 In a subsequent report to Congress, the U.S. De-
partment of Defense stated that: “U.S. forces have taken reasonable 
measures to minimize collateral injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects while conducting their military operations, often at increased risk to 
U.S. personnel.”75 U.S. forces seem to recognize that legitimate war-
fighting requires that they accept reasonable risks in order to avoid harming 
civilians. As former Air Force pilot Chris Stewart writes: “I . . . never met a 
pilot or crewmember in the U.S. Air Force who was not willing to take at 
least some risk to avoid being the one to drop his ordnance atop women, 
children, hospitals or a passenger train. That is the way Americans conduct 
war.”76 According to Charles Dunlap, the “disposition to so readily balance 
potential military losses against expected enemy civilian fatalities is rooted 
deep in the American psyche.”77  
In support of its position, the Manual cites no U.S. practice of forego-
ing precautions that would greatly reduce risk to civilians while only slightly 
increasing risk to attacking forces, let alone accompanying opinio juris that 
such conduct is lawful. Instead, the Manual cites the 1991 telegram to the 
ICRC discussed earlier: 
 
“Feasible precautions” are reasonable precautions, consistent with mis-
sion accomplishment and allowable risk to attacking forces. While collat-
eral damage to civilian objects should be minimized, consistent with the 
above, collateral damage to civilian objects should not be given the same 
level of concern as incidental injury to civilians. Measures to minimize 
collateral damage to civilian objects should not include steps that will 
place U.S. and allied lives at greater or unnecessary risk.78 
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Nowhere does the telegram state that any operational risk or risk to attack-
ing forces renders a precaution unreasonable, infeasible, or otherwise op-
tional. On the contrary, a precaution that only slightly increases operational 
risk may be “consistent with mission accomplishment.” Similarly, a precau-
tion that only slightly increases risk to attacking forces may be “allowable.” 
The Manual contains no such qualifications.  
Importantly, the telegram states that measures to minimize collateral 
damage to civilian objects should not include steps that will place U.S. and 
allied lives at greater risk. In contrast, the telegram does not say that 
measures to minimize incidental injury to civilians should not include steps 
that will place U.S. and allied lives at greater risk. On the contrary, the tele-
gram states that “collateral damage to civilian objects should not be given 
the same level of concern as incidental injury to civilians.”79 Presumably, this 
sentence means that injury to civilians should be given a higher level of con-
cern than damage to civilian objects. It seems to follow that measures to 
minimize incidental injury to civilians may include steps that will place at-
tackers at greater risk, at least when the greater risk to attackers is clearly 
outweighed by the reduced risk to civilians. If anything, the telegram un-
dercuts rather than supports the position of the Manual.  
According to the Manual, the precautions rule never requires attackers 
to accept “an increased risk of harm to their own forces.”80 In contrast, 
according to the telegram, the precautions rule requires attackers to accept 
“allowable risk to attacking forces.”81 Some readers may hope that the cita-
tion to the telegram is intended to qualify the seemingly unqualified lan-
guage of the text. However, according to the Manual,  
 
it was desirable that this manual’s main text convey as much information 
as possible without the reader needing to read the footnotes. For exam-
ple, it was desirable to avoid the possibility that a reader might misunder-
stand a legal rule addressed in the main text because a notable exception 
to that rule was addressed only in a footnote accompanying the text.82 
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This passage suggests that sources quoted in footnotes are not intended to 
significantly modify propositions put forward in the text.83  
The Manual itself offers no direct argument for its interpretation of the 
precautionary principle, but we might cobble one together from pieces of 
an earlier section. Consider the following claims made by the Manual:  
 
Military necessity may be defined as the principle that justifies the use of all 
measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible 
that are not prohibited by the law of war.84 
 
Certain law of war rules may direct that persons comply with an obliga-
tion, but only to the extent feasible or consistent with military necessity. Ex-
amples of rules incorporating the concept of feasibility or necessity include 
the following: 
 
 Certain affirmative duties to take feasible precautions to re-
duce the risk of harm to the civilian population and other pro-
tected persons and objects.85 
 
These passages suggest that, according to the Manual, a feasible precaution 
is one that is consistent with military necessity, that is, with defeating the 
enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible. It would follow that any pre-
caution that might make defeating the enemy more difficult is ipso facto in-
feasible and therefore not legally required.  
This approach is clearly mistaken. While military necessity reflects only 
military considerations, the feasibility of a precaution takes into account 
both humanitarian and military considerations. It is therefore incorrect to 
equate feasibility with military necessity alone. As the Manual elsewhere 
states, “[t]he extent to which military necessity justifies [incidental] harms 
[to civilians] is addressed by the principle of proportionality.”86 As we shall 
see, the principle of proportionality, not the principle of military necessity, 
determines the scope of our precautionary obligations.  
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Interestingly, the Manual distinguishes between the proportionality principle 
and the proportionality rule. The proportionality principle “generally weighs 
the justification for acting against the expected harms to determine whether 
the latter are disproportionate in comparison to the former.”87 In contrast, 
the proportionality rule specifically “obliges persons to refrain from attack-
ing where the expected harm incidental to such attacks would be excessive 
in relation to the military advantage anticipated to be gained.”88  
According to the Manual,  
 
[t]he principle of proportionality is reflected in many areas in the law of war. 
  
Proportionality most often refers to the jus in bello standard applicable to 
persons conducting attacks. Proportionality considerations, however, may 
also be understood to apply to the party subject to attack, which must 
take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of incidental harm.89   
 
Of course, persons conducting attacks also must take feasible precautions 
to reduce the risk of incidental harm. It seems to follow that proportionali-
ty considerations should inform the precautionary obligations of both at-
tackers and defenders.  
What would it mean for attackers or defenders to apply proportionality 
considerations to their precautionary obligations? It seems logical that they 
should weigh the justification for acting without taking a precaution against 
the expected harms of not taking that precaution to determine whether the 
latter are disproportionate in comparison to the former. If choosing differ-
ent weapons or tactics would place civilians at much less risk and would 
place soldiers at only slightly greater risk, then they must be chosen. Con-
versely, if choosing different weapons or tactics would place civilians at 
only slightly less risk and would place soldiers at much greater risk, then 
they need not be chosen. When the risks on each side are more closely bal-
anced, military commanders must exercise reasonable judgment based on 
the information available to them at the time.  
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On this approach, the precautions rule and the proportionality rule 
work together to balance humanitarian and military considerations across 
the targeting process. The proportionality rule weighs the overall military 
considerations in favor of an attack against the overall humanitarian consid-
erations against an attack. In contrast, the precautions rule balances the 
marginal military considerations in favor of attacking using particular means 
and methods against the marginal humanitarian considerations in favor of 
attacking using alternative means and methods.90  
Indeed, it would be illogical for the law of war to determine whether at-
tacks may be carried out based on humanitarian considerations but not to 
regulate how attacks may be carried out based on humanitarian considera-
tions. Put another way, the proportionality rule can prohibit the pursuit of a 
military advantage while the precautions rule can only regulate the pursuit of 
a military advantage. It makes no sense for humanitarian considerations to 
inform the more restrictive rule but not the less restrictive rule.  
To see the illogic of the Manual even more clearly, consider that often 
the military advantage anticipated from an attack lies precisely in its contri-
bution to the success of future missions or to the future safety of the at-
tacking force. Nevertheless, if the expected harm to civilians is excessive in 
relation to the anticipated reduction in future operational and personal risk, 
then the attack is flatly prohibited by the proportionality rule. Yet, accord-
ing to the Manual, humanitarian considerations that can outweigh opera-
tional and personal risk under the proportionality rule count for nothing 
under the precautions rule. We might be forced to accept such an illogical 
result by strong evidence or argument that the result is compelled by treaty 
or custom. As we have seen, the Manual provides no such evidence.  
 
IV. PROPORTIONALITY AND HUMAN SHIELDS 
 
An ordinary combatant takes refuge in an apartment building, for the spe-
cific purpose of using the presence of the residents to dissuade your forces 
from attacking him. Most of the residents are unaware of his presence. 
Others are too young, old, sick or infirm to leave. Your armed forces have 
no troops on the ground and no way to warn those residents who can leave 
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to do so. The most discriminate weapons and tactics available to you will 
destroy half of the building, killing scores of residents.  
As a legal officer, what would you advise? As a commander, what 
would you order? As an operator, what order would you obey?  
 
A. The Law 
 
Article 51 of Protocol I declares that  
 
The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protec-
tion against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to 
this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applica-
ble rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.91  
 
The same article later states the proportionality rule that protects civilians 
from attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life 
. . . which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”92 One sentence later, the very same article categori-
cally prohibits using civilians as human shields, either by moving civilians 
near military objectives (active shielding) or by moving military objectives 
near civilians (passive shielding) for the purpose of shielding those objec-
tives from attack.93 Finally, the next sentence states that “any violation of 
these prohibitions shall not release the [other] Parties to the conflict from 
their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population.”94  
The import of Protocol I is unmistakable. The proportionality rule shall 
be observed in all circumstances. In particular, one party’s unlawful use of civil-
ians as human shields shall not release other parties from their legal obligation 
not to knowingly inflict incidental harm on those civilians that would be 
excessive in relation to the anticipated advantage.95 Returning to the scenar-
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io with which this part began, under Protocol I it would be unlawful to at-
tack the apartment building, killing scores of residents, in order to kill one 
ordinary combatant. This approach seems normatively sound. The resi-
dents should not lose their rights through no fault of their own, and it 
would be wrong to punish them for the crimes that the combatant com-
mits against them.  
Importantly, most international lawyers distinguish between voluntary 
shields and involuntary shields. Voluntary shields are civilians who freely 
choose to remain in or near military objectives, specifically intending to 
thereby prevent or dissuade attacks on those objectives.96 Involuntary 
shields are civilians who are used by defending forces to prevent or dis-
suade attacks on nearby military objectives against their will, without their 
knowledge, or without their consent.97 Although the legal status of volun-
tary shields remains controversial, many experts argue that voluntary 
shields directly participate in hostilities and thereby lose their protection 
under the proportionality rule.98 In contrast, most international lawyers 
agree that involuntary shields retain their protection under the proportion-
ality rule.99 This part will focus on the status of involuntary shields, for rea-
sons that will soon become clear. 
On this balanced view, attacking forces must compare the collateral 
harm that they expect to inflict on involuntary shields with the military ad-
vantage that they expect to obtain from their attack. If the anticipated ad-
vantage is great and the expected harm is small then the attack is lawful. 
Conversely, if the expected harm is great and the anticipated advantage is 
small then the attack is unlawful. On this balanced view, the presence of 
involuntary shields does not automatically preclude an attack. Nor, howev-
er, does the fact that civilians are involuntary shields—rather than unwit-
ting passersby—automatically permit an attack. Here, as elsewhere, the law-
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fulness of an attack depends on the balance of military considerations in 
favor of attack and humanitarian considerations against attack.   
So much for the 174 parties to Protocol I. What about the 19 non-
signatories to Protocol I, including the United States, Iran, Israel, and Sri 
Lanka? Is it possible that, under customary law, the proportionality rule 
need not be observed in all circumstances? Is it possible that, under cus-
tomary law, one party’s use of civilians as involuntary shields releases op-
posing parties from their legal obligation not to inflict otherwise excessive 
harm on those civilians?  
Such a view defies the general principle of customary international law 
that “[t]he obligation to respect and ensure respect for international hu-
manitarian law does not depend on reciprocity.”100 Under customary law, 
each party’s legal obligations with respect to the civilian population apply 
categorically, unconditionally and independently of the conduct of the op-
posing party. After all, these legal obligations are not owed to the opposing 
party but to the civilian population. These legal obligations rest not on con-
siderations of fairness or reciprocity but on considerations of humanity.  
To see the same point from a different angle, consider that the legal 
obligations of combatants correspond to and are grounded in the legal 
rights of civilians. Under international law, “individual civilians shall enjoy 
general protection against dangers arising from military operations . . . un-
less and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”101 More 
broadly, civilians can only lose their legal rights through their own conduct. 
Conversely, civilians cannot lose their legal rights due to the illegal conduct 
of others. As Michael Schmitt puts it, “a Party to the conflict [that] is plac-
ing the civilians at risk in order to enhance its military position . . . should 
not be permitted to deprive civilians of the protections to which they are 
entitled under the LOAC.”102 
Put another way, the “in all circumstances” provision and the “shall not 
release” provision of Protocol I are not substantive norms that may be re-
jected while the principles of distinction, precautions, and proportionality 
are accepted. Instead, the two provisions are declaratory norms, and what 
they declare is the unconditional application of the principles of distinction, 
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precautions, and proportionality. One cannot endorse the principles of dis-
tinction, precautions, and proportionality only on the condition that the 
opposing party fulfills its legal obligations. On the contrary, it is constitu-
tive of the principles of distinction, precautions, and proportionality that 
they apply unconditionally.  
With these general considerations in mind, let us turn to specifics. Ac-
cording to the ICRC,  
 
State practice indicates that an attacker is not prevented from attacking 
military objectives if the defender fails to take appropriate precautions or 
deliberately uses civilians to shield military operations. The attacker re-
mains bound in all circumstances, however, to take appropriate precau-
tions in attack and must respect the principle of proportionality even 
though the defender violates international humanitarian law.103 
 
Put more precisely, an attacker is not automatically prevented from attacking 
military objectives if the defender uses civilians to shield military opera-
tions. In contrast, if the expected harm to involuntary shields would be ex-
cessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage then the attacker 
must respect the principle of proportionality even though the defender vio-
lates international humanitarian law.  
For example, Israel is not a party to Protocol I and regularly faces ad-
versaries that use civilians as human shields. Arguably, Israel is even a 
“specially affected State” with “a distinctive history of participation in the 
relevant matter, . . . that ha[s] had a wealth of experience, or that ha[s] oth-
erwise had significant opportunities to develop a carefully considered mili-
tary doctrine” and whose practice is therefore particularly significant.104 
Famously, the Israeli Supreme Court holds that when “civilians are forced 
to serve as “human shields” . . . the rule is that the harm to the innocent 
civilians must fulfill, inter alia, the requirements of the principle of propor-
tionality.”105 The official position of the Israeli Defense Forces remains 
that, “[w]ith respect to involuntary shields, Israel adopts the majority view 
that involuntary shields retain all civilian protection. An attacker . . . must 
consider their presence when making proportionality calculations.”106  
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The ICRC found no contrary practice among States that are not party 
to Protocol I. In addition, no State party to Protocol I has stated that harm 
to involuntary shields may be excluded from the proportionality rule in 
non-international armed conflicts to which Protocol I does not apply. Since 
the use of involuntary shields is particularly common in non-international 
armed conflicts, the absence of contrary practice on this point is particular-
ly telling.  
Finally, according to Michael Schmitt, the view that “treats involuntary 
shields as civilians entitled to the full benefits of their international humani-
tarian law protections,” “seems to dominate among international humani-
tarian law experts.”107 Schmitt elsewhere describes the opposing view, that 
harm to involuntary shields may be entirely disregarded in determining the 
proportionality of an attack, as “an extreme view that has, fortunately, 
gained little traction.”108  
 
B. The Manual 
 
From 2002 to 2013, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently took the po-
sition that  
 
Joint force targeting . . . is driven by the principle of proportionality, so 
that otherwise lawful targets involuntarily shielded with protected civilians 
may be attacked . . . provided that the collateral damage is not excessive 
compared to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by the 
attack.109  
 
While U.S. forces were engaged in over a decade of irregular warfare 
against armed groups that used civilians as involuntary shields, the Joint 
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Chiefs consistently maintained that such civilians “have not lost their pro-
tected status” and remain protected by the proportionality rule.110  
Unfortunately, the Manual departs from the balanced view of the U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the IDF, the ICRC, and the majority of law of war 
experts. The Manual takes the following position:  
 
Harm to the following categories of persons and objects would be under-
stood not to prohibit attacks under the proportionality rule: (1) military 
objectives [that is, enemy combatants, civilians taking a direct part in hos-
tilities, and military equipment]; (2) certain categories of individuals who 
may be employed in or on military objectives; and (3) human shields.111  
 
Strikingly, the Manual draws no distinction between civilians who freely 
choose to serve as voluntary human shields and civilians forced to serve as 
involuntary human shields. According to the Manual, neither harm to vol-
untary shields nor harm to involuntary shields will prohibit attacks under 
the proportionality rule.  
Recall the scenario with which we began. According to the Manual, the 
proportionality rule would not prohibit an attack on the apartment build-
ing, despite the fact that the expected deaths of scores of residents would 
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from killing one ordinary combatant. Since the combatant in-
tends to use the residents to shield himself from attack, harm to the resi-
dents is effectively excluded from the proportionality rule. According to 
the Manual, as far as proportionality is concerned, the residents may as well 
not exist.  
The Manual’s position generates other illogical results. Consider the fol-
lowing scenario:  
 
Military targets A and B are weapons caches containing the same number 
of rifles. Ten civilians are unwittingly passing by target A. Twenty civilians 
are forced to serve as involuntary human shields for target B. 
 
If the military advantage anticipated by destroying the weapons in each 
cache is fairly small then it might be disproportionate to strike target A, 
                                                                                                                      
110. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, E-2–E-3 
(2007) (“[A] defender may not use civilians as human shields . . . . In these cases, the civil-
ians have not lost their protected status and joint force responsibilities during such situa-
tions are driven by the principle of proportionality.”). 
111. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.12.3.  
 
 









killing ten civilians. However, according to the Manual, it is necessarily pro-
portionate to strike target B, killing twenty civilians, because those civilians 
are being used as involuntary human shields. This result seems illogical. If a 
military advantage cannot justify killing ten civilians who have done noth-
ing to forfeit their legal rights then an equivalent military advantage cannot 
justify killing twenty civilians who also have done nothing to forfeit their 
legal rights.  
To see a subtler problem with the Manual’s position, compare the fol-
lowing scenarios:   
 
1. An ordinary combatant runs through a crowded market because that is 
the fastest route to his destination. Attacking him will kill many nearby 
civilians.   
 
On any plausible view, the proportionality rule would prohibit attacking the 
combatant in scenario 1, because the expected collateral harm is great and 
the anticipated military advantage is small. Now consider the following var-
iation: 
 
2. The same combatant runs through the same market because he hopes 
that he will not be attacked with so many civilians nearby. Attacking him 
will kill the same number of nearby civilians.   
 
According to the Manual, the proportionality rule would permit attacking 
the combatant in scenario 2 because he is using the nearby civilians as hu-
man shields. Yet it seems illogical that the lawfulness of killing the nearby 
civilians should turn on the combatant’s mental state—his purpose or mo-
tive for co-locating with civilians—rather than on the expected harm to the 
civilians and the anticipated military advantage of killing the combatant.   
A legal position that generates such illogical results should be rejected 
absent overwhelming evidence in its favor. Remarkably, the Manual offers 
none. The Manual cites no State practice or opinio juris directly supporting 
its claim that harm to human shields cannot render an attack dispropor-
tionate. Since the proportionality rule states a general prohibition, the Man-
ual bears the burden of establishing a specific exception or exemption to 
that general prohibition.  
Interestingly, the Manual does not suggest that human shields directly 
participate in hostilities or are otherwise military objectives. Nor does the 
Manual suggest that, like civilians who work in or on military objectives, 













from military operations” and therefore lose their protection under the 
proportionality rule.112 Finally, the Manual does not suggest that there is 
some additional military advantage to attacking military objectives protect-
ed by human shields that offsets the expected loss of civilian life.113  
Instead, the Manual states the following:  
 
Use of human shields violates the rule that civilians may not be used to 
shield, favor, or impede military operations. The party that employs hu-
man shields in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack as-
sumes responsibility for their injury, provided that the attacker takes fea-
sible precautions in conducting its attack. 
 
If the proportionality rule were interpreted to permit the use of human 
shields to prohibit attacks, such an interpretation would perversely en-
courage the use of human shields and allow violations by the defending 
force to increase the legal obligations on the attacking force.114 
 
It is not clear whether these statements are intended de lege lata or de lege 
ferenda. I will consider each of these statements in the following sections, 
both as a matter of law and as a matter of logic.  
Interestingly, in a 1990 law review article, W. Hays Parks writes that  
 
While an attacker facing a target shielded from attack by civilians is not 
relieved from his duty to exercise reasonable precautions to minimize the 
loss of civilian life, neither is he obligated to assume any additional re-
sponsibility as a result of the illegal acts of the defender. Were an attacker 
to do so, his erroneous assumption of additional responsibility with re-
gard to protecting the civilians shielding a lawful target would serve as an 
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incentive for a defender to continue to violate the law of war by exposing 
other innocent civilians to similar risk. 115  
 
Parks later chaired the DoD working group that prepared the Manual, from 
1996 until 2010.116 Although the Manual does not cite Parks’ article in its 
discussion of human shields, the similarities between the two suggests that 
Parks’ views may have influenced its formation. We should therefore con-
sider any additional evidence or arguments contained in Parks’ article.   
First, we should consider whether the Manual’s basic position—that no 
amount of expected incidental harm to human shields can render an attack 
unlawfully disproportionate—has any basis in U.S. practice. We have al-
ready seen that the U.S. Joint Chiefs have consistently maintained that in-
voluntary shields retain their protection under the proportionality rule. 
What of the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces?  
The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations re-
wards close reading. The applicable passage says that 
 
Deliberate use of civilians to shield military objectives from enemy attack 
is prohibited. Although the principle of proportionality underlying the concept of 
collateral damage continues to apply in such cases, the presence of civilians within 
or adjacent to a legitimate military objective does not preclude attack of it. 
Such military objectives may be lawfully targeted and destroyed as needed 
for mission accomplishment. In such cases, responsibility for the injury 
and/or death of such civilians, if any, falls on the belligerent so employ-
ing them.117 
 
Since the principle of proportionality “continues to apply” to involuntary 
shields, the claim that their presence “does not preclude attack” on shield-
ed objectives can only mean that the presence of involuntary shields does 
not automatically or necessarily preclude attack on shielded objectives. Instead, 
such attacks are precluded if and only if they would be disproportionate. 
Similarly, the claim that “responsibility for the injury and/or death of such 
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civilians, if any, falls on the belligerent so employing them” can only mean 
that if the principle of proportionality is satisfied then responsibility falls on 
the defender but not the attacker. Conversely, if the principle of propor-
tionality is violated then responsibility falls on both the defender that un-
lawfully uses human shields and the attacker that unlawfully kills human 
shields.  
To see this point more clearly, contrast the previous passage with the 
immediately following passages:  
 
The presence of civilian workers, such as technical representatives aboard 
a warship or employees in a munitions factory, in or on a military objec-
tive, does not alter the status of the military objective. These civilians may be 
excluded from the proportionality analysis.  
 
Civilians who voluntarily place themselves in or on a military objective as 
“human shields” in order to deter a lawful attack do not alter the status of 
the military objective. While the law of armed conflict is not fully devel-
oped in such cases, such persons may also be considered to be taking a di-
rect part in hostilities or contributing directly to the enemy’s warf-
ighting/war-sustaining capability, and may be excluded from the proportionality 
analysis.118  
 
The Handbook explicitly states that civilian workers and voluntary shields 
may be excluded from the proportionality analysis. In sharp contrast, the 
Handbook does not say that involuntary shields may be excluded from the 
proportionality analysis. This sharp contrast between adjacent provisions 
implies that involuntary shields may not be excluded from the proportional-
ity analysis.  
In 2011, the U.S. Air Force targeting doctrine endorsed the propor-
tionality rule and nowhere excluded harm to involuntary shields from its 
application or interpretation.119 Instead, the Air Force stated that  
 
civilians may not be used as “human shields” to protect military targets 
from attack. The fact that they may be used to do so does not necessarily 
prevent the military object from being attacked. As directed or time per-
mitting, targets surrounded by human shields will probably need to be re-
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viewed by higher authority for policy and legal considerations based on 
the specific facts.120 
 
Indeed, the use of involuntary shields does not necessarily prevent military 
objects from being lawfully attacked. Nevertheless, the use of involuntary 
shields may render an attack unlawful under the proportionality rule.  
In 2014, the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s School explained 
that  
 
Where civilians are present on the battlefield or in proximity to legitimate 
military objectives, or are being used to shield legitimate targets from an 
attack that otherwise would be lawful, they are at risk of injury incidental 
to the lawful conduct of military operations. A law of armed conflict vio-
lation occurs where the civilian population is attacked intentionally; where 
collateral civilian casualties become excessive in relation to military neces-
sity; and/or where a defender or attacker employs civilians as voluntary 
or involuntary human shields. Each constitutes a violation of the princi-
ple of distinction.121 
 
Indeed, involuntary shields are at risk of injury incidental to the lawful con-
duct of military operations. In contrast, an attack that otherwise would be 
lawful is a law of armed conflict violation where collateral civilian casualties 
become excessive in relation to military necessity. Tellingly, the Air Force 
JAG School draws no distinction between civilians present on the battle-
field or in proximity to legitimate military objectives and civilians being 
used as involuntary shields. The proportionality rule protects them both 
equally.   
Elsewhere, the Air Force JAG School notes that a “nation that uses its 
civilian population to shield its own military forces violates the law of war 
at the peril of the civilians behind whom it hides.”122 Importantly, this 
statement appears in a discussion of the principle of distinction, expressing 
the obligation of defenders to distinguish themselves from their civilian 
population. When the authors discuss the principle of proportionality, a 
mere five sentences later, involuntary shields are not even mentioned. The 
authors later clarify that “the use of human shields does not necessarily 
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prevent the military object from being attacked.”123 In contrast, as we have 
seen, an attack that inflicts excessive harm on civilians not taking direct 
part in hostilities—including involuntary shields—is a law of armed con-
flict violation. It therefore seems that the Manual departs from consistent 
U.S. practice.   
In his 1990 article, Parks took the view that 
 
Excluded in determination of collateral civilian casualties are: . . . civilians 
injured or killed as a result of the enemy placing them around a lawful 
target in an effort to shield it from attack.124 
 
Naturally, Parks’ article could not anticipate U.S. practice, Israeli practice, 
or other State practice in the twenty-six years since its publication. Most of 
the State practice cited in the article pre-dates the adoption of Protocol I. 
Since Protocol I crystallized the proportionality rule—and affirmed that the 
rule rests on humanity irrespective of reciprocity—State practice prior to 
1977 is inherently unreliable evidence that customary international law ex-
empts human shields from protection under the proportionality rule.  
In any event, Parks’ article does not identify a single example of a State 
applying the proportionality rule while excluding human shields from its 
protection. Of course, States have carried out attacks on military objectives 
despite the presence of human shields. It hardly follows that these States 
excluded expected harm to human shields from their proportionality analy-
sis. They may have determined that the expected harm to human shields 
was outweighed by the anticipated military advantage. Alternatively, these 
States may not have conducted a serious proportionality analysis at all. As 
leading U.S. lawyers elsewhere explain,  
 
Although the same action may serve as evidence both of State practice 
and opinio juris, the United States does not agree that opinio juris simply can 
be inferred from practice.  
 
. . .  
 
A more rigorous approach to establishing opinio juris is required. It is criti-
cal to establish by positive evidence, . . . that States consider themselves 
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legally obligated [or permitted] to follow the courses of action reflected in 
[purported] rules.125 
 
Such positive evidence of opinio juris is essential to distinguish State practice 
that reflects or generates customary law from State practice that misapplies 
or violates customary law. Opinio without usus is sometimes empty, but usus 
without opinio is always blind.  
Remarkably, in 225 pages, which include 663 footnotes, Parks identifies 
only one source that explicitly states that the proportionality rule excludes 
harm to involuntary shields: an unpublished 1983 document entitled “Pro-
portionality in a Nutshell” written by Parks himself.126 Simply put, Parks’ 
article identifies no State practice or opinio juris supporting the categorical 
exclusion of harm to involuntary shields from the proportionality rule.127  
Importantly, Parks writes that “The classic example of a disproportion-
ate action is the destruction of a village of 500, including its population, to 
destroy a single enemy sniper or machine gun position.”128 Yet, if the sniper 
or gunner positions himself in the village for the specific purpose of using 
the proximity of civilians to prevent or dissuade an attack on his position 
then he uses those civilians as passive, involuntary human shields. As we 
have seen, according to Parks, expected harm to involuntary shields should 
be excluded from the application of the proportionality rule. It follows that 
Parks’ “classic example of a disproportionate action” is, according to Parks’ 
own view, perfectly proportionate after all. This implication seems like a 
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As we have seen, the Manual asserts that:  
 
The party that employs human shields in an attempt to shield military ob-
jectives from attack assumes responsibility for their injury, provided that 
the attacker takes feasible precautions in conducting its attack.129 
 
It seems that, according to the Manual, a defender’s “responsibility” for 
expected harm to human shields relieves an attacker of its “responsibility’’ 
for expected harm to human shields, provided that the attacker takes feasi-
ble precautions in conducting its attack. On this view, attackers may not 
inflict unnecessary harm on human shields but attackers may inflict dispropor-
tionate harm on human shields or, more precisely, expected harm that 
would ordinarily be considered excessive in relation to the anticipated mili-




In support of its argument, the DoD cites two U.S. sources: an instructor 
training document from 1975 and the 1991 telegram to the ICRC discussed 
earlier.130 Since the training document predates Protocol I and is clearly not 
an official expression of opinio juris, I will discuss it no further.  
The telegram to the ICRC is worth reading closely. Recall that the tele-
gram is a point-by-point response to an ICRC memorandum. Paragraph 
4B(1) of the ICRC memorandum states that 
 
A distinction must be made in all circumstances between combatants and 
military objectives on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on 
the other. It is forbidden to attack civilian persons or objects or to launch 
indiscriminate attacks.131 
 
In direct response to this paragraph, the telegram says that 
 
In no case may a combatant force utilize individual civilians or the civilian 
population to shield a military objective from attack. A nation that utilizes 
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civilians to shield a target from attack assumes responsibility for their in-
jury, so long as an attacker exercises reasonable precaution in executing 
its operations.132 
 
Read alongside the passage of the ICRC memorandum to which it directly 
responds, this passage of the telegram says that harm to human shields will 
not render an attack indiscriminate so long as an attacker exercises reasonable 
precaution in executing its operations. So understood, this passage of the 
telegram seems sound. Presumably, reasonable precaution in executing op-
erations includes directing attacks at specific military objectives, using 
means and methods of combat that can be so directed and the effects of 
which can be limited as required by international humanitarian law.  
Crucially, the Manual cites the quoted passage of the telegram in sup-
port of its position that harm to human shields will not render an attack 
disproportionate.133 Yet, as we have seen, neither this passage of the telegram 
nor the passage of the memorandum to which it directly responds says any-
thing about the proportionality rule. Instead, the ICRC invokes the propor-
tionality rule for the first time in the next paragraph of its memo, 4B(2):  
 
All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid loss of civilian life or 
damage to civilian objects, and attacks that would cause incidental loss of 
life or damage which would be excessive in relation to the direct military 
advantage anticipated are prohibited.134 
 
In direct response to this paragraph, the telegram makes four comments on 
the nature and application of the proportionality rule.135 Revealingly, no-
where in its discussion of the proportionality rule does the telegram refer to 
the responsibility of the defending force or otherwise indicate that the pro-
portionality rule excludes harm to human shields.  
In short, the telegram states that involuntary shields retain their protec-
tion under the precautions rule and that an attack that satisfies the precau-
tions rule is necessarily not indiscriminate. In contrast, the telegram never 
says that involuntary shields lose their protection under the proportionality 
rule or that an attack that satisfies the precautions rule is necessarily not 
disproportionate. Simply put, the telegram provides no legal support for the 
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Manual’s position that civilians used as involuntary shields retain their pro-
tection under the precautions rule but lose their protection under the pro-
portionality rule.  
In his 1990 article, Parks asserts that “[u]nder the customary law of 
war, casualties resulting from a defender’s use of the civilian population as 
concealment or cover from attack of legitimate military objectives are not 
the responsibility of the attacker so long as he has exercised ordinary 
care.”136 Parks repeats this assertion throughout his article.137 Remarkably, 
Parks cites only two sources that directly support his assertion. The first 
source is a quotation from the 1924 edition of Air Power and War Rights by 
James Spaight, a distinguished scholar and lawyer for the British Air Minis-
try:  
 
[A]s a belligerent cannot allow himself to be prejudiced because the ene-
my locates . . . [military] objectives in places where they cannot be de-
stroyed without incidental injury to civilians, he is not responsible for the 
resulting damage provided all due care is taken to prevent unnecessary in-
jury.138 
 
Parks’ reliance on this quotation is curious since, in the 1933 edition of the 
very same book, Spaight writes that “[i]f a military objective is situated in 
such a densely populated neighborhood, or if the circumstances of the case 
are otherwise such that any attack upon it from the air is likely to involve a 
disastrous loss of non-combatant life, aircraft are bound to abstain from 
bombardment.”139 It seems that Spaight’s considered view was that attack-
ers remain bound by the proportionality rule despite the misconduct of 
defenders.  
The second source that Parks cites as direct support for his assertion is 
the following passage from the 1976 Air Force Pamphlet discussed earlier:  
 
The failure of states to segregate and separate their own military activities, 
and particularly to avoid placing military objectives in or near populated 
areas and to remove such objectives from populated areas, significantly 
and substantially weakens effective protection for their own population. 
A party to a conflict which places its own citizens in positions of danger 
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by failing to carry out the separation of military activities from civilian ac-
tivities necessarily accepts, under international law, the results of other-
wise lawful attacks upon valid military objectives in their territory.140 
 
This passage provides no support for Parks’ assertion. The pamphlet states 
that a defender’s placement of military objectives in or near a populated 
area weakens effective protection for their own population. The pamphlet 
does not state that a defender’s misconduct weakens legal protection for its 
own population. Similarly, the pamphlet states that a party that places its 
own citizens in danger accepts the results of otherwise lawful attacks upon 
valid military objectives. Evidently, an attack expected to cause harm to 
civilians out of all proportion to the anticipated military advantage is not 
otherwise lawful. Nowhere does the pamphlet state that an otherwise un-
lawful attack is lawful if the civilians it is expected to kill are human shields.  
On the contrary, the Air Force pamphlet observes that civilian casual-
ties may occur in armed conflict due to several factors, including the fact 
that civilians may be “used unlawfully in an attempt to shield military ob-
jectives from attack.”141 In the very same paragraph, the pamphlet then ex-
plains that  
 
Attacks are not prohibited against military objectives even though inci-
dental injury or damage to civilians will occur, but such incidental injury 
to civilians or damage to civilian objects must not be excessive when 
compared to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Care-
ful balancing of interests is required between the potential military ad-
vantage and the degree of incidental injury or damage . . . .142 
 
In short, the pamphlet applies the proportionality rule to all incidental inju-
ry to civilians, with no exception for civilians used as involuntary shields.  
Finally, Parks asserts throughout his article that international law tradi-
tionally held defenders “responsible” for collateral harm to civilians.143 
Parks appears to rest his assertion on the historical fact that, for centuries, 
international law did not clearly prohibit attackers from inflicting extensive 
collateral harm on civilians, paradigmatically during siege warfare, but only 
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from attacking undefended areas. Parks goes on to claim that Protocol I 
illegitimately “shifted” responsibility from defenders to attackers.144  
In my view, Parks’ legal argument rests on a conceptual mistake. As the 
Manual itself recognizes, the law governing the conduct of hostilities is 
prohibitive rather than permissive.145 It follows that the absence of a clear 
prohibition should never be confused for an affirmative authorization. Sad-
ly, there was a time when international law did not clearly prohibit rape, 
enslavement, or the murder of prisoners. It hardly follows that internation-
al law authorized such conduct or held defenders “responsible” for such 
conduct. Similarly, the fact that the proportionality rule was slow to crystal-
lize does not entail that customary law authorized attackers to inflict ex-
pected harm out of all proportion to anticipated advantage or absolved at-
tackers of “responsibility” for such disproportionate harm. We should not 
interpret the slow and halting advance of international law as a positive en-
dorsement of the status quo ante. It seems that Parks’ argument, repeated 
almost verbatim in the Manual, is legally unsound. As we shall see, this argu-




To recall, the Manual claims that a defender who employs human shields 
assumes responsibility for their injury and concludes that an attacker who ex-
pects to kill many human shields in pursuit of a small military advantage 
does not violate the proportionality rule. Simply put, the DoD’s conclusion 
is a non sequitur. Of course, defenders who use human shields are responsi-
ble for the foreseeable harm that they occasion. It simply does not follow 
that attackers who kill human shields are not responsible for the foreseea-
ble harm that they inflict and may therefore inflict foreseeable harm out of 
all proportion to the military advantage they anticipate. In the context of 
war, attributing responsibility is not a zero-sum game.  
Return to the scenario with which we began. No doubt, the combatant 
has acted wrongfully, even criminally, by using the residents as involuntary 
shields. But now the choice is yours: to kill the residents or to spare them. 
If you choose to kill the residents then you cannot deny responsibility for 
your choice. The combatant is responsible for his choice and you are re-
sponsible for yours. The combatant is wrong to use the residents as invol-
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untary shields and you would be wrong to kill the residents simply to elimi-
nate the combatant.  
Suppose that a bank robber takes a bank teller hostage and uses her to 
shield his escape. You are a police officer and may lawfully kill the bank 
robber to prevent his escape. However, if you shoot at the bank robber 
then you will almost certainly kill the hostage as well. If you shoot at the 
bank robber and kill the hostage then no doubt the robber (assuming he 
survives) will be held criminally responsible for her death. After all, he put 
her in harm’s way. But surely you may also be held criminally responsible 
for her death. After all, you shot her. Perhaps you can convince a court that 
you did not act recklessly, that the risk of killing the hostage, though sub-
stantial, was justifiable in light of the danger posed by the bank robber. But 
surely you will convince no one that, so long as you tried your best not to 
shoot the hostage, you had no obligation to weigh the risk of killing her 
against the need to stop the robber. The robber put her in harm’s way but, 
ultimately, her life was in your hands.  
In his 1990 article, Parks writes that “[p]lacing civilians in proximity to 
a military position that is likely to be attacked with the intent of shielding 
that object from attack differs little from lining up those same civilians and 
executing them by firing squad; the same premeditation is required.”146 Cer-
tainly, those who line up civilians before a firing squad are responsible for 
their deaths. Nevertheless, the members of the firing squad who shoot the 
civilians are also responsible for their deaths. The guilt of the former does 
not entail the innocence of the latter.  
Parks begs the question when he writes that “the illegal act . . . is the 
crime that places innocent civilians at risk, while attack of a lawful target is 
a legitimate act authorized by the law of war.”147 Indeed, using human 
shields is an illegal act and a war crime. However, attack of a lawful target is 
not a legitimate act authorized by the law of war if such an attack is ex-
pected to inflict harm on civilians that would be excessive in relation to the 
military advantage anticipated. In the quoted passage, Parks seems to as-
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sume his conclusion, namely that expected harm to human shields cannot 
render attack of a lawful target an illegitimate act prohibited by the law of 
war.  
Finally, Parks writes the following:  
 
Attack of a military objective, wherever located, is lawful. While the num-
ber of civilian casualties that occur are the result of that attack, the attack 
is not necessarily the cause of those casualties, nor may they necessarily 
be attributable to the attacker. The approach under discussion suggests 
that “but for the attack, these civilian losses would not have occurred; 
therefore the attacker is responsible.” This approach would make any at-
tack on any target, wherever located, illegal, notwithstanding the actions 
of the defender.148 
 
Every sentence of this passage is incorrect. First, attack of a military objec-
tive, wherever located, is lawful only if it is not expected to inflict harm on 
civilians that would be excessive in relation to the military advantage antici-
pated. Second, if civilian casualties are the result of an attack then, by defi-
nition, the attack is necessarily the cause of those casualties. That is what 
the words “cause” and “result” mean. Third, if “but for the attack, these 
civilian losses would not have occurred” then of course the attacker is caus-
ally responsible for those losses (as is the defender). In contrast, the attack-
er is criminally responsible for those losses only if the expected losses were 
excessive in relation to the anticipated advantage. For its part, the defender 
is criminally responsible for using human shields whether harm results or 
not.149 Finally, the approach Parks rejects would not make any attack on 
any target, wherever located, illegal, if it is expected to harm civilians. In-
stead, on this approach, an attack on a legitimate target is illegal only if the 
expected harm to civilians would be excessive in relation to the anticipated 




The Manual also claims that “[i]f the proportionality rule were interpreted 
to permit the use of human shields to prohibit attacks, such an interpreta-
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tion would perversely encourage the use of human shields.”150 Put the oth-
er way around, if the proportionality rule is interpreted to exclude expected 
harm to human shields, such an interpretation would discourage the use of 
human shields. Parks makes similar claims throughout his 1990 article.151 
This argument rests on a series of legal, factual, and logical mistakes.  
First, this argument falsely assumes that individual civilians enjoy spe-
cific legal protections unless and for such time as stripping them of some 
legal protections might yield desirable consequences. On the contrary, indi-
vidual civilians enjoy general legal protection unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.152 It is a truism that the law of war seeks 
to “alleviat[e] as much as possible the calamities of war.”153 It hardly fol-
lows that the law of war is some crude exercise in rule-consequentialism.154 
Parties should always strive to reduce overall suffering, but never at the 
expense of individual civilians entitled to legal protection.  
For example, the law of war does not permit terroristic attacks directed 
against civilians even when such terror would hasten the end of the war. 
Nor does the law of war permit attacking civilians in order to leave irregu-
lar combatants nowhere to hide. Similarly, even if excluding expected harm 
to involuntary shields from the proportionality rule would discourage the 
future use of involuntary shields, it simply does not follow that the law of 
war should deny those civilians who are used as involuntary shields legal 
protection under the proportionality rule. Civilians lose their legal protec-
tion only when they choose to directly participate in hostilities, not when-
ever dictated by some utilitarian calculus.  
Importantly, it is a State’s conduct, not its interpretation of the propor-
tionality rule as such, that affects a defender’s incentives to use human 
shields. In order to discourage the use of human shields in the way the 
Manual suggests, the United States would have to order our forces to 
knowingly kill civilian men, women, and children—forced against their will 
or used without their consent as involuntary human shields—whose deaths 
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would ordinarily be considered excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated. In blunt terms, the Manual proposes 
that we kill more civilians now so we will have to kill fewer civilians later.  
As far as I am aware, there is no empirical evidence that if we exclude 
civilians used as human shields from the proportionality rule then we will 
end up killing fewer civilians overall. True, if attackers disregard harm to 
human shields then defenders may use fewer civilians as human shields; on 
the other hand, attackers will kill almost all of those civilians whom de-
fenders nevertheless use as human shields. The number used may be small-
er, but the proportion killed will be greater. Conversely, if attackers apply 
the proportionality rule to human shields then defenders may use more 
civilians as human shields; on the other hand, attackers will only kill some 
of the civilians who are in fact used as human shields. The number used 
may be greater, but the proportion killed will be smaller. Absent empirical 
evidence that the difference in the number used will offset the difference in 
the proportion killed, the DoD’s position seems to rest entirely on a priori 
speculation.  
Of course, the proportionality rule prohibits attacks expected to kill ci-
vilians that are based on mere speculation that the long-term benefits will 
outweigh the short-term costs. Instead, the proportionality rule compares 
expected harm to civilians only to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated. According to the ICRC, “the advantage concerned should be 
substantial and relatively close, and . . . advantages which are hardly percep-
tible and those which would only appear in the long term should be disre-
garded.”155 The Manual takes a more expansive view (a topic for another 
day), but concedes that, under the proportionality rule, “the military ad-
vantage may not be merely hypothetical or speculative.”156 It seems illogical 
to deny civilians protection under the proportionality rule based on the 
very kind of speculation that the rule itself rejects.  
Indeed, the DoD’s a priori prediction that disregarding expected harm 
to involuntary shields will dramatically reduce the use of involuntary shields 
is highly implausible. Presumably, defenders heedless of law and morality 
will use involuntary shields if and only if the expected benefits to defenders 
outweigh the expected costs to defenders. By disregarding harm to invol-
untary shields, attackers deprive defenders of one potential benefit of using 
human shields, namely temporary avoidance of attack. The question then 
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becomes whether the other expected benefits of using involuntary shields 
outweigh the expected costs of using involuntary shields.  
Importantly, it is not ordinarily costly for a combatant to take refuge in 
a residential building, for a group to establish a command center in a hospi-
tal, or for a unit to fire rockets from a schoolyard. In each such case, de-
fenders use civilians as involuntary shields at little cost to themselves. It 
follows that if ruthless defenders expect any significant benefit from using 
civilians as involuntary shields then they will do so irrespective of the legal 
position of the attacking force. For example, if such defenders expect that 
the killing of involuntary shields by attackers will redound to the defenders’ 
broader strategic advantage—by, for instance, gaining them new recruits or 
by politically isolating attackers—then defenders will continue to use invol-
untary shields when it is not costly to do so. Significantly, since only the 
defenders’ subjective expectations affect their behavior, it does not matter 
whether they are in fact likely to gain the advantage that they expect.  
In an earlier exchange, Charles Dunlap notes that taking and maintain-
ing hostages is often quite costly, such that if harm to hostages is excluded 
from the proportionality rule then the costs of taking hostages would out-
weigh the benefits of taking hostages.157 Of course, most involuntary 
shields are not hostages who need to be fed, clothed, washed, hidden, and 
regularly moved (think again of the apartment residents, the hospital pa-
tients, and the school children in the previous examples). In addition, many 
hostages are held for ransom rather than for use as human shields. Finally, 
many hostages are taken from the attacker’s political community; attackers 
may therefore refrain from attack not for legal reasons but for emotional, 
political or ethical reasons. It is therefore doubtful that excluding harm to 
hostages from the proportionality rule will reduce the number of hostages 
taken by defenders enough to offset the number of hostages killed by at-
tackers.  
In any event, as we have seen, such utilitarian considerations are legally 
beside the point. The law of war protects each individual civilian unless and 
for such time as he or she directly participates in hostilities. There is no 
legal basis for stripping individuals of their protection under the propor-
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tionality rule in the hope that the long-term benefits to others may out-
weigh the immediate costs to them. Nor, as we have seen, is there any fac-




Finally, the DoD claims that  
 
If the proportionality rule were interpreted to permit the use of human 
shields to prohibit attacks, such an interpretation would . . . allow viola-
tions by the defending force to increase the legal obligations on the at-
tacking force.158  
 
Similarly, in his 1990 article, Parks writes that “an attacker facing a target 
shielded from attack by civilians . . . is [not] obligated to assume any addi-
tional responsibility as a result of the illegal acts of the defender.”159  
In fact, violations by the defending force do not “increase” the legal 
obligations on the attacking force, but instead trigger the ordinary legal ob-
ligation not to inflict excessive incidental harm on civilians. Evidently, de-
fending forces trigger this obligation whenever they locate their personnel 
and equipment near civilians, whether or not they intend to thereby shield 
their personnel and equipment from attack and whether or not they fail to 
take feasible precautions against the effects of attacks. When this obligation 
is triggered, attackers are free to grumble but they must obey.  
Similarly, Parks’ reference to “additional responsibility” is misplaced. 
Both the responsibility to exercise reasonable precautions and the respon-
sibility not to inflict excessive incidental harm on civilians are basic respon-
sibilities that the law of war imposes on all attacking forces. Naturally, both 
responsibilities are triggered if, and only if, civilians are near military objec-
tives. Importantly, these general responsibilities are triggered whether civil-
ians are near military objectives by chance or by force, and whether de-
fenders are fulfilling or breaching their own legal responsibilities.  
Perhaps the DoD means that it is unfair for defending forces to inten-
tionally trigger the legal obligations of the attacking force, through unlawful 
conduct, as a means of obtaining tactical advantage. Put more simply, it 
seems unfair for defenders to profit from their wrongdoing. Indeed it is. 
However, it does not follow that attacking forces may deprive defending 
                                                                                                                      
158. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.12.3.3.  
159. Parks, supra note 115, at 163.  
 
 









forces of such unfair advantages by killing involuntary shields out of all 
proportion to the military advantage anticipated from an attack.  
War, like other parts of life, is often unfair. Killing involuntary shields 
shifts the unfair burdens imposed on the attacking force, not onto the de-
fending force that imposed them, but onto the latter’s civilian victims. We 
cannot correct but can only compound the unfairness of war by killing ci-
vilians who have done nothing to forfeit their legal rights. Instead, we 
should annul the unfair advantages gained through the use of involuntary 
shields by prosecuting those who use them for war crimes. We should not, 




As its authors remind its users, the Manual “is not a substitute for the care-
ful practice of law.”161 In my view, the careful practice of law will often re-
quire cautioning commanders and warfighters against following the Manu-
al’s provisions on target selection, precautions in attack, and proportionali-
ty as it concerns human shields. Legal advisors are duty-bound to offer 
professional, candid, and independent counsel regarding, inter alia, the in-
ternational law of war. If a legal advisor determines that military operations 
that comply with the Manual nevertheless violate international law then it is 
his or her duty to inform combatants of the discrepancy and to advise the 
legally safer course of action. If combatants find such advice confusing or 
unsatisfying then they should address their concerns to the General Coun-
sel of the DoD.  
The Manual “does not necessarily reflect the views of any other de-
partment or agency of the U.S. Government or the views of the U.S. Gov-
ernment as a whole.”162 It follows that the Manual cannot be assumed to 
reflect U.S. opinio juris or to generate customary international law. Neverthe-
less, states like Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka may cite the Manual to justify 
their wartime conduct, particularly with respect to the killing of civilians 
forced to serve as involuntary human shields.163 If they do so then the U.S. 
State Department may have to intervene and clarify the U.S. position.  
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Finally, the Manual “does not . . . preclude the Department from sub-
sequently changing its interpretation of the law.”164 In my view, the De-
partment should change its interpretation of the law without delay. Every 
day that the Manual remains unchanged increases the risk that it will be re-
lied upon by the U.S. military, by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, or 
by foreign States. If that happens then civilian men, women, and children 
will lose their lives in violation of international law. Alternatively, the law of 
war may lose its moral credibility in the eyes of our armed forces.   
When the President of the United States assures the American people 
and the people of the world that the United States obeys the law of war—
even in covert operations—those words should mean something. Those 
words should mean that the United States selects targets so as to minimize 
loss of civilian life; that the United States takes precautions to avoid harm 
to civilians, even at reasonable risk to attacking forces; and that the United 
States will not knowingly kill civilians except when justified by the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated. So long as the Manual remains 
unchanged, such assurances will mean little or even nothing. The world will 
not know whether the President refers to the international law of war or to 
the law of the Manual. Whenever civilians are killed in U.S. operations the 
world will wonder which law we followed. Many will assume the worst. In 
such ways, the Manual undermines the international legitimacy of U.S. mili-
tary action. In this sense, the Manual is a self-inflicted act of “lawfare.”165  
                                                                                                                      
Government of Sri Lanka should immediately use its diplomatic channels to clear its name 
with the US Department of State based on the deliberations found in the 1204-page DOD 
Manual. . . . Using the language of the DOD Manual when in discourse with state depart-
ment officials is the first move: after all, it is their policy document on Law of War.”).   
164. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 1.1.1. 
165. For the intended meaning and unintended use of the term, see Charles J. Dun-
lap, Jr., Lawfare Today . . . and Tomorrow, 87 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 315 (2011).  
